Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
2006

Liability Externalities and the Law: A Comment on Cooter and
Porat
Keith N. Hylton
Boston University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Keith N. Hylton, Liability Externalities and the Law: A Comment on Cooter and Porat , in 1 Journal of Tort
Law (2006).
Available at: https://doi.org/10.2202/1932-9148.1042

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at
Boston University School of Law. For more information,
please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.

DATE DOWNLOADED: Fri Sep 9 20:34:32 2022
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 21st ed.
Keith N. Hylton, Liability Externalities and the Law: A Comment on Cooter and Porat,
1 J. TORT L. [ii] (2006).
ALWD 7th ed.
Keith N. Hylton, Liability Externalities and the Law: A Comment on Cooter and Porat,
1 J. Tort L. [ii] (2006).
APA 7th ed.
Hylton, K. N. (2006). Liability externalities and the law: comment on cooter and
porat. Journal of Tort Law, 1(1), [ii]-[i].
Chicago 17th ed.
Keith N. Hylton, "Liability Externalities and the Law: A Comment on Cooter and
Porat," Journal of Tort Law 1, no. 1 (2006): [ii]-[i]
McGill Guide 9th ed.
Keith N. Hylton, "Liability Externalities and the Law: A Comment on Cooter and Porat"
(2006) 1:1 J Tort L [ii].
AGLC 4th ed.
Keith N. Hylton, 'Liability Externalities and the Law: A Comment on Cooter and Porat'
(2006) 1(1) Journal of Tort Law [ii]
MLA 9th ed.
Hylton, Keith N. "Liability Externalities and the Law: A Comment on Cooter and
Porat." Journal of Tort Law, vol. 1, no. 1, 2006, pp. [ii]-[i]. HeinOnline.
OSCOLA 4th ed.
Keith N. Hylton, 'Liability Externalities and the Law: A Comment on Cooter and Porat'
(2006) 1 J Tort L [ii]
Provided by:
Fineman & Pappas Law Libraries
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and
Conditions of the license agreement available at
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use:
Copyright Information

Liability Externalities and the Law: A
Comment on Cooter and Porat*
Keith N. Hylton

Abstract
Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat have offered a simple model of tort liability with sensible
reform proposals. Their focus is in on damage levels, and how those levels can be modified to
reflect the socially desirable level of externalization. However, to the extent that there is any
gain to be achieved by modifying damage awards, it would be better to secure this gain through
other approaches, such as adopting a more careful analysis of factual causation or reducing the
likelihood of judicial error.

'Keith N. Hylton is Professor of Law and Paul J. Liacos Scholar, Boston University.
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INTRODUCTION

Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat have offered a simple model of tort liability that
makes sense,' and is more consistent with the law than the authors acknowledge.
Their focus is in on damage levels, and how those levels can be modified to
reflect the socially desirable level of externalization. However, the common law
largely reflects the general concerns that they raise in their analysis. Moreover, to
the extent that there is any gain to be achieved by modifying damage awards, the
principle change they advocate, it would be better to secure this gain through
other approaches, such as adopting a more careful analysis of factual causation or
reducing the likelihood of judicial error.2
The core of the argument appears early in their piece:
Law should discourage activities with negative liability
externalities. A tax on the activity would discourage it. Many
jurisdictions tax driving, but we know of no jurisdiction that
calibrates the tax according to the risk that drivers impose on
others. In the absence of a tax on risk, law should increase liability
beyond full compensation in order to discourage driving. In
general, liability law should adjust damages in light of the
externalities that it creates.
Unlike pedestrians and drivers, patients contract with doctors
for treatment and willingly submit to the risk of harm. ...
Imperfections cause some kinds of doctors to convey more positive
than negative externalities on their patients. ... Liability law does
not need to discourage the activity of doctoring, and it needs to
-3
encourage some specialties.
I agree with the general thrust of this claim, and I think the law is largely
consistent with it. For the most part, the negligence rule is applied when negative
.
.
4
externalities are roughly in balance with positive externalities. Strict liability is
applied when the negative externalities associated with an activity far outweigh
the positive externalities. I also agree with the general direction of the reform
suggestions of Cooter and Porat. They have identified and provided a theoretical
framework for analyzing important problems in the intersection of tort law and
health care.
1 Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Liability Externalities and Mandatory Choices: Should
DoctorsPay Less?, 1 J. TORT L. 2 (2006).
2 For example, the likelihood of judicial error can be reduced in the medical malpractice
setting by having medical professionals serve as neutral expert advisors to courts.
SCOoter & Porat, supra note 1, at 1.
'Keith N. Hylton, A Missing Market Theory of Tort Law, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 977 (1996).
5
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I. A FEW QUIBBLES

My disagreements with Cooter and Porat appear at the level of detail. It is not the
case that drivers impose only risk on other drivers or on pedestrians. Imagine a
world in which the roads were relatively empty. Would that be one of ideal
safety? No. Highwaymen have existed for millennia precisely because they take
advantage of low density traffic. There are some external benefits that drivers
provide to other drivers and sometimes to pedestrians as well. Moreover, the
risks that drivers impose among themselves are entirely reciprocal. When we take
into account the externalization of benefits as well as costs, we see that the law
justifiably treats driving as an activity that is not unusual in terms of risk
externalization, and therefore applies the negligence rule.6
According to Cooter and Porat, doctors convey more positive than negative
externalities on their patients. But there is no reason to think that externalized
benefits - benefits that are not taken into account by the market - are unusually
large in the medical care context. Most patients are aware that they are receiving
benefits in excess of the fees that they are paying. I am aware of no empirical
evidence that the market demand schedule for medical services fails to reflect the
net benefits of those services to patients.
Another detail that carries a lot of weight with Cooter and Porat is the matter
of mandatory choice. Cooter and Porat have in mind the doctor who must do
some procedure - he cannot simply walk out of the emergency room and say "my
shift is up, time to go home." This strikes me to be a useful description of the
extreme short run in many settings, but I am not sure how much should be pinned
on this case. I think that once we are outside of the extreme short run, there are
no mandatory choices. Any doctor can decide, after going home, that he is not
going to return to work the next morning. Or, perhaps more realistically, any
doctor can decide to scale back his activities gradually until he has reduced his
practice to zero.
In addition, I find the mandatory choice example a little troubling because it is
unclear to me whether this is an analysis of care or of activity choices. It seems
most persuasive as an analysis of activity level choices. However, viewed in this

6 Id.
7 Consider,

for example, the market for food. Food also conveys the same positive externality
as health care, because it permits people to function, enabling them to provide for dependents and
coworkers. If medical care provides substantial positive externalities not captured by the market,
the same would appear to be true of food. In spite of the absence of empirical evidence on this
issue, I am willing to believe that there are substantial positive externalities in the food and
medical care markets, but these would be limited to the most basic goods and services. The robust
markets for food and medical care in the U.S. are far beyond meeting basic needs.
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light, it runs into the problem that few activity level decisions can accurately be
described as mandatory.
Cooter and Porat offer the following illustration of the mandatory choice
problem.
An obstetrician must decide whether to deliver a baby by
vaginal or cesarean birth. In this difficult case, vaginal birth
imposes the unavoidable risk of harm to baby and mother of 200
with probability .10 (expected harm of 20), whereas cesarean birth
imposes the unavoidable risk of different harm of 300 with
probability .10 (expected harm of 30). The obstetrician mistakenly
chooses cesarean birth and the harm materialized. A court applies
a negligence rule to these facts and finds the obstetrician liable.8

-

Cooter and Porat note that in this example, the incremental harm from the
obstetrician's decision to choose cesarean birth is $100 with probability .10.
However, when the court applies the negligence rule Cooter and Porat envision, it
imposes a damage award of $300. The damage award that would align incentives
correctly would be $100. Thus, the negligence rule leads to an excessive award
and distorts the decisions of obstetricians.
Strict liability performs well in regulating incentives in the obstetrician
example. If the obstetrician is held strictly liable for harms, then the incremental
liability from choosing cesarean birth will be $100 with probability .10. Since
incremental liability is equal to incremental harm under strict liability, the
obstetrician's incentive to choose cesarean birth is not inefficiently discouraged.
Negligence, as envisioned by Cooter and Porat in their obstetrician example,
does not work so well in regulating care. This is a general point that applies to the
negligence rule in the presence of factual causation issues. As Mark Grady
noted, 9 it is this failure that leads to a discontinuous jump in expected liability as
an actor crosses the threshold from reasonable care to negligence.
This
discontinuous jump could lead to excessive carelo and, as Cooter and Porat
explain, discourage some medical specialties as activities.
With respect to the mandatory choices examined by Cooter and Porat, there
are standard approaches available to courts that do not require any changes in the
rules on damage awards. The core problem they emphasize in the obstetrician
example is factual causation. Strict liability regulates optimally in this context
although, of course, it discourages medical practice in general. Alternatively,
8

Cooter & Porat, supra note 1, at 1-2.

9 Mark F. Grady, A New Positive Theory of Negligence, 92 YALE L. J., 799 (1983). See also,

Marcel Kahan, Causation and Incentives to Take Care under the Negligence Rule, 18 J. LEGAL
STUD. 427 (1989).
10

Id.
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courts could attempt to be careful about causation and hold the obstetrician liable
only for the incremental harm. In other words, courts could attempt to apply the
same careful and perspicacious analysis of causation that Cooter and Porat
provide in their paper.
Altering the rules governing damages could introduce new problems. To the
extent that the new rules fail to regulate care decisions, the obstetrician's
incentive to take care may decline. In addition, the new rules could be quite
difficult to administer."
The final detail is one I briefly noted earlier; the distinction between care and
activity levels.
The negligence rule usually applies to discrete precaution
decisions, such as the decision to look both ways before driving across a road or
the decision not to monitor a patient's vital signs for a specific time period during
surgery. Negligence claims usually do not involve general methods or approaches,
such as the choice between boat or airplane transportation or the choice between
cesarean and vaginal delivery. By focusing on a choice between general methods
of practice, Cooter and Porat may have produced reform suggestions that have
undesirable consequences for discrete precaution choices.
For example, a
decision to reduce damage awards so that they disgorge gains from choosing one
method instead of another, or so that damages start at a baseline of zero for the
best method, might eliminate the incentive to take care after a particular method is
adopted. 12
II. FORMAL ANALYSIS OF COOTER AND PORAT

The formal analysis consists of a simple model I find quite useful as a way of
thinking about damages and externality.
Cooter and Porat say that "to
completely internalize marginal net benefits, the actor's expected marginal net
payoff must equal the net social benefit of the activity to others." 13 This is
represented by the equation:
m-qd= b-ph

1 Consider, for example, a disgorgement rule, one of the reforms suggested by Cooter and
Porat. To work effectively, a disgorgement rule must wipe out the gains the actor receives from
taking the socially undesirable option. But it may be almost impossible to objectively determine
the gains. Moreover, to the extent the disgorgement remedy is a predictable tax on wages, it
affects the supply decisions in a way that may partially offset the tax. A predictable tax that
effectively disgorges gains would have to be determined in a several stage process of adjustment
to market outcomes.
12 Of course, Cooter and Porat recognize this potential flaw, see Cooter & Porat, supra note 1,
at 18.
13 Cooter & Porat, supra note 1, at 8.
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All of these terms apply to marginal activity units. The model implies that if the
social benefits are captured in the private reward (the price on the marginal
activity unit), m = b and therefore setting damages equal to h is optimal. I find
this easiest to interpret as a norm for regulating activity levels.
However, I find this model useful primarily as a general shorthand
framework.
And I disagree with some of their specific applications. For
example, take the case of driving. Cooter and Porat say that since there is no
market, m = 0. But this ignores the fact that drivers get their own personal benefit
from driving, and this is what should be taken into account on the left hand side of
the equation. Given this, m should not be set equal to zero. Cooter and Porat also
claim that the external benefit from driving is zero, b = 0. But I think the external
benefit from driving is positive - recall my example of highwaymen. This means
that driving should not be taxed with strict liability or with some damage
multiplier, as suggested by Cooter and Porat.
CONCLUDING REMARKS

Although I disagree with some of the specific applications in the formal analysis
of Cooter and Porat, I agree with the general framework. It is consistent with a
framework I introduced in a paper several years ago. 14 I used my framework,
which I labeled the "missing markets model", to provide a positive theory of tort
doctrine - specifically of the choice between strict liability and negligence.
An analysis of external benefits as well as external costs is most useful, in my
view, in trying to understand the tort doctrine that exists. Once existing tort
doctrine is seen to reflect a reasonable consideration of the external costs and the
external benefits associated with activities, the scope of beneficial reforms will
appear to be somewhat narrower. Tort law can be reformed for the better, but any
reform effort should avoid introducing new problems or making some existing
problems worse.
Since Cooter and Porat have taken the valuable step of providing concrete
reform suggestions, I will close with a similar effort.
In spite of my
disagreements with some of the details of their argument, their analysis of the
causation problem in medical care should be taken seriously and followed by
policy makers. Rather than modifying damage awards, the better reform in my
view would be the adoption of rigorous causation analyses in medical malpractice
litigation. Enhancing the rigor of causation analyses would have the same
limiting effect on damage awards advocated by Cooter and Porat, and at the same
time avoid introducing new problems.

14 Hylton, supra note 4. See also Keith N. Hylton, Duty in Tort Law: An Economic Approach,
75 FORDHAM L. REv. 101 (2006).
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